

C.D. Howe Institute

Benefactors Lecture, 2004

Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy

Allan Gotlieb

*Former Canadian Ambassador to the United States
and Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Toronto, November 3, 2004

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Foreword

This year's Benefactors Lecture is a provocative delight. And it will prove to be a critical historical document, presenting a review of Canada's past foreign policy and drawing a compelling picture of how the nation can best pursue its interests abroad — particularly in fostering its relationship with the United States. The paper has the unique advantage of being written from the perspective of Allan Gotlieb, one of Canada's foremost foreign-policy experts and practitioners. He has served as Undersecretary of State for External Affairs and as Ambassador to the United States during the critical years when the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was negotiated. He was arguably the most effective envoy to the U.S. that Canada has known.

Given the depth of his learning and experience, this Lecture will receive careful attention from experts, scholars and interested Canadians over the years because of its many insights and its capable charting of an effective future foreign policy for Canada.

The key point raised by Mr. Gotlieb is that Canada's postwar foreign policy has shifted uneasily, and often to the country's detriment, between realism and romanticism. However, romanticism does not serve the nation well when it fails to promote Canada's practical interests. The country needs a reality-based foreign policy that recognizes the dominance of the United States as a superpower and, while not automatically supporting the foreign initiatives of that colossus, resists often-widespread pressures to tweak its nose just for the sake of being different.

The paper is frank and finely argued. It recommends that we liberate ourselves from the belief that the United Nations is a sacred foundation for our foreign policy. At the same time, Canadian policymakers should break away from the romantic utopianism that puts rule-making and the promotion of the country's values abroad at the top of its foreign-policy agenda.

Canada should deepen its economic and security relationships with the United States as the cornerstone of a foreign policy that will make a difference around the world, says Mr. Gotlieb. "The most important requirement is the recognition that our destiny as a sovereign nation is inescapably tied to our geography."

This year's Benefactors Lecture is sponsored by NM Rothschild & Sons Canada Limited. I especially want to thank Daniel Labrecque for his willingness to support this prestigious publication by the C. D. Howe Insti-

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tute. I also wish to thank Bill Robson, Kevin Doyle, Sheila Protti, Tom Roberts and Wendy Longsworth, who helped review, edit, and prepare the Lecture for publication.

Jack M. Mintz
President and Chief Executive Officer
C.D. Howe Institute

Every nation needs a psychiatrist, Robertson Davies once observed, although I have never found the quote. He must have said it because it is so true in Canada's case. In the five decades that I have been involved, in one way or another, in Canadian foreign policy, I have often thought that Canadians have a split personality. We seem constantly attracted to opposite poles in our thinking about our role in the world.

One pole ties us to hard reality, *realpolitik* if you will, and makes us want our governments to protect the national interest when it deals with other states. Canadians, when they think this way, talk in terms of our sovereignty, security, territory, trade, economic growth and prosperity.

In contrast to the pole of realism, there is another pole that attracts Canadians to an idealistic vocation. Its advocates tend to have a visionary, at times almost romantic, approach to our position in the world. The vision changes from time to time, but at its most expansive, it is based on a mission to create a more just world, promote democracy, reduce inequities among nations, protect victims of injustice and alleviate the conditions of the poor and oppressed. Canadians believe, as the slogan of a national book chain proclaims, "the world needs more Canada."

These two destinations in our thinking have not always pulled in opposite directions. On various occasions in our history, one or the other served as a spur to action. Sometimes they led to coherent strategies, but at times our national interests and international aspirations seemed irreconcilable.

In describing these as the realist and the romantic approaches to Canadian foreign policy, I must emphasize that the actual goals have been far from static. The continuing importance of the two visions lies in their formative power to define and shape our national goals.

Last year, the C.D. Howe Institute's Benefactors Lecture was the occasion for a *cri-de-coeur* from a distinguished scholar, Jack Granatstein, who urged Canadians to recognize that Canadian foreign policy must be rooted in the national interest and that anti-Americanism is severely undermining that principle (Granatstein 2003). He deplored our tendency to formulate foreign policy in terms of our values rather than interests and to do so in a self-congratulatory, moralistic way, preening as if we were a "moral superpower." He warned of the danger — citing myself, I am flattered to say — of foreign policy becoming "arbitrary, quixotic or even a personal indulgence of its leader," if it is not based on the national interest (Gotlieb 2003b).

Some other distinguished Canadian writers on foreign policy to whom I am also indebted, such as Denis Stairs (2003, 2001a, 43–49) and Kim Nossal (2003), have been withering in their criticism of Canada's "imperialism of

values," while others express concern about Canada's becoming a "Boy Scout imperialist," and "the busybody of international politics" (Hay 1999, 228).

Does the prominence of these voices in the public debate mean that the pendulum is swinging towards a reality-based foreign policy for Canada?

The answer is an emphatic no. Support for a visionary approach to Canadian foreign policy has been growing over the past decade and remains remarkably tenacious. In fact, in recent years Canadian foreign policy seems to be responding to a missionary impulse which drives us to try to export our values to the less fortunate peoples of the world. Canada's role, our leaders have been telling us, is to convince other countries to emulate our values of multiculturalism, compassion, democracy and tolerance. That is a goal predicated on the view that what the world needs is more Canada. If that is what it needs, then it's our moral duty to give it.

These relatively new, value-oriented goals appear, on first inspection, consistent with a deeply rooted, traditional theme in our national psyche, that of Canada as the world's foremost peacekeeper, peacemaker and peace builder. But as the decline of our capability to play such a role became more evident in recent years, due largely to lack of resources — and perhaps even as a result of the decline — a new vision of Canada's mission emerged, more ambitious but less expensive. In official circles, it is increasingly expressed in terms of our attempts to create new norms of international behaviour which, in turn, reflect our values. The authors of the Canadian foreign policy review of 1995 — *Canada in the World* — committed Canadians to the goal of "an international system...ruled by law not power," no small task (Welsh 2004, 193).

Such grand aspirations are not confined to official thinking. In the academic international-affairs community in Canada (yes, there is such a thing) there is strong support for the view that Canada's role in the world is to provide the "intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership to promote norm creation" (Riddell-Dixon 2004).

In place of sovereignty and independence, natural security and economic growth, the leading advocates of Canada's international vocation seem to be establishing a new trinity in the goals of Canadian foreign policy — value-projection, peace building and norm creation.¹ The national interest is barely visible on their horizon.

1 You will read more about *norm creation* and *norm entrepreneurship* in this article. I apologize for the jargon but, alas, it has become the vocabulary of Canada's visionary advocates.

The Axworthy Factor

The most activist of Canadian foreign ministers in recent history, Lloyd Axworthy, conceived of Canada as an "agent of change," an avatar of the "responsibility to protect" the victims in the world, rallying global networks to break the monopoly power of elites and resist "the way of the warrior" (read the U.S.), which uses its military power "to seduce, shape and when necessary coerce" compliance with its own goals (Axworthy 2003). He saw Canada as leader of the "third way," positioned between the victims and the elites, the country with "the right stuff to be agents of change." Although the rhetoric of his successors is not as dramatic, the foreign policy thrust of a successor, Bill Graham, remained heavily value oriented. He saw Canada's mission to be the champion of equality, diversity and humanitarian concerns (Graham 2002b). These values, officials inform us, are increasingly focused on "post-material priorities," such as the environment, civil society, status of women and minority rights (Lee 2002).

Some scholars find such goals ill defined, overreaching and divorced from the national interest. "Lloyd Axworthy," they have said, "unleashed an ambitious doctrine of intrusive internationalism, transforming the tone and character of Canadian foreign policy" (Hillmer and Chapnick 2001, 68). Another fears Canada finding itself "typecast in the role of pitchman at the carnival sideshow" (Copeland 2001, 171). But the visionary school of Canadian foreign policy, even at its most crusading level, is seen by some distinguished historians, such as John English (2001, 29), and by Robert Bothwell (2000, A18), Canada's leading authority on the history of Canadian foreign policy, as firmly planted in the longstanding Canadian liberal tradition.

What Canadians leave largely unexamined is whether the broad, visionary approach, focused on transforming state behaviour rather than on specific conflict resolution, can accomplish very much, aside from making its advocates feel good.

In recent times, arguments between advocates of the two competing themes have become louder and sharper. Perhaps this increasing national irritability arises from the growing appreciation of our declining influence and the sense of impotence that comes from the lack of hard resources that can help Canada make a difference in the world.

But I believe the reasons lie deeper and are to be found in the almost revolutionary changes that have occurred in the international order in recent years. Canadians are now far more conscious than ever before of the encroachment of the international environment on our daily lives. When terrorist threats are regular occurrences, when acts of genocide are visible in our living rooms, when crossing international borders becomes an anxiety-

ridden challenge, when frightening diseases and environmental issues have no boundaries, when our economic survival depends so starkly on access to the market of a single foreign power, Canadians begin to realize that foreign policies actually have some relevance to their personal lives.

Canadians are also coming to recognize, although we have been slow in doing so, that the United States is not the same nation that it was before the events of September 11, 2001. Now one issue — and only one — dominates U.S. relations with other countries: national security.

In these circumstances, some Canadians advocate a hard-nosed role for Canada in the world. Canada must adopt a reality-based foreign policy by responding to the imperatives of geography, history and economics. The supreme challenge for Canada, in their view, is to improve the relationship with the colossus to the south and make Canada more secure, without reducing our independence and sovereignty.

But others have a contrary vision: The mission of Canada, they argue, is to support countervailing forces against the colossus and try to create new norms, or rules, to constrain its power.

Of course, one can advocate either approach or a blend of the two and maintain that the ensuing policies are in our true national interest. Idealists will argue that greater human security abroad means greater safety for Canadians at home. Advocates of *realpolitik* will see greater Canadian influence in Washington as a way to enhance our global role. These are not simply different ways of describing similar challenges: Major differences of style and substance flow from the way one thinks about Canadian foreign policy.

Foreign Policy through the Years

What follows in the pages of this paper is an account of the effects of these two poles — the realistic and the romantic — in Canadian foreign policy over nearly half a century.

In providing this account, I must apologize for what some might believe to be, perhaps with justice, a tendency to over generalization or even provocation. I must also warn that what I am providing is a very personal account and, I am sure, open to challenge and differing interpretations. It is the perspective of one who was a practitioner, not a scholar. I should acknowledge, moreover, that, among my former tribe, few would regard my views as orthodox. In justification, I can say only that they were formed in the earliest days of my diplomatic career and when I was very impressionable but they have stayed with me to this day.

Where I Stand

Let me state at the outset my conclusions about Canadian foreign policy, as it has emerged through the decades:

- Realism and romanticism, or *realpolitik* and the missionary spirit, have done battle to occupy centre stage in our foreign policy;
- These competing themes have often failed to be reconciled and have created confusion and incoherence;
- The theme of realism, or the national interest, has remained a constant and has been dedicated to three broad goals over time: control over territory and resources, national unity, and more secure economic access to foreign markets, in particular the United States
- The idealistic theme, a do-good impulse, while also a constant, has evolved in recent years, from helpful fixer and honest broker to norm-entrepreneur, change agent and protector of victims. Arguably, it has metastasized from a do-good to a feel-good foreign policy.
- Whether motivated by protecting our sovereignty, or achieving a better world, our foreign policy has often been characterized by a reluctance to commit resources, a tendency to moralize and proclaim superior values.

The National Interest and the Law of the Sea

As I warned, there is a personal element in this story. I joined the Department of External Affairs at the time of the Suez Crisis in the era of High Pearsonianism. The Canadian diplomatic service had an astonishing reputation in those days. In Oxford, where I was recruited, the eminent philosopher Stuart Hampshire told me it was the best in the world. I did not need to be convinced. But I was not happy when I was assigned to be the desk officer on the Law of the Sea. I did not leave the high tables of Oxford in order to deal with fish. Or so I thought.

There were two types of assignments in headquarters in those days. The exciting, challenging and glamorous appointments were to the political divisions. This is where one did good works. To be avoided at all costs were the functional divisions — the Consular, Passport, Information and Legal ones. This was true also of the Economic Division, where one dealt with tariffs on Polish chickens and the like, and the U.S.A. Division, which consisted in its entirety of two people working on bridges and other cross-border issues. Not only did the officers in these support divisions have to deal with grubby issues, they got no recognition.

It is impossible to capture the atmosphere of romance, thrill and intellectual excitement that marked the political bureaus in those days. The political officers were the chosen ones, a small dedicated band of brothers (yes, they were overwhelmingly male) engaged in the great adventure of building a new international order.

I emphasize these personal impressions because, working on the Law of the Sea virtually alone in the Legal Division, I was acutely aware of the duality underlying the Canadian diplomatic experience. There on one side were the brightest and the best, the diplomatic missionaries, engaged in saving the world from the scourge of the arms race, the Soviet threat and dangerous conflicts in far-flung regions of the world. In the bread-and-butter divisions, where I was consigned to toil, one waited out one's time hoping that better things would come along.

In being assigned to territorial waters, I was, however, about to plunge (no pun intended) into an area of exceptional importance to Canada where, though unglamorous, our national interest was directly at stake.

As for those creative and idealistic diplomats who were winning honours and applause at the United Nations for helping resolve international crises, I am sure they, too, believed they were pursuing the national interest. They were helping to resolve conflicts between our allies, as in Suez and Cyprus, bridging transatlantic differences in NATO and helping build international institutions and a better world — altogether a good thing. It is in the interest of Canadians to live in a stable and peaceful world.

But the pursuit of the national interest in order to extend our sovereignty in response to purely domestic pressures is a different matter. Our efforts are seen as aimed not at a better world, but a more prosperous Canada, even, if need be, at the expense of our friends and others. For Canada, our policies on the law of the sea were about gaining control over international navigation, U.S. smugglers, Russian and European fishermen, foreign polluters and other unwanted intruders. We were not saving the world; we were trying to appropriate a larger part of it. The operative principle was: if it's water, grab it.

Concern over maritime borders was not all that surprising for a country with by far the longest coastline in the world. What is more surprising is that, in the inter-war years, Canada did not draw any distinction between imperial interests and Canadian ones. It was the British who defined our national interests. For the champion of the freedom of the high seas, the three-mile rule was an article of faith.

This principle of international law was under heavy challenge during the League of Nations era by a number of states including the Soviet Union, which wanted recognition of the legitimacy of a 12-mile limit. At the Codifi-

cation Conference that the League convened at The Hague in 1930, Canada exercised its newly acquired right to representation separate from that of the mother country. My first job in the Legal Division was to ascertain what position Canada took at the conference. No easy task. I could find only one statement in all the records made by the Canadian representative, a very junior officer named Lester Pearson, and it consisted of one sentence: Canada supports the position of Great Britain in favour of the three-mile limit. Canadian interests and imperial interests were one.

Two decades later, the Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial Waters established by the Privy Council, determined our national interests to be otherwise: Canada should seek international agreement on a 12-mile territorial sea.

Realism-based diplomacy was about to emerge in full flower.

However, the approach brought Canada, at the height of the Cold War, and possibly for the first time in its history as a sovereign nation, into sharp opposition to both the United States and Great Britain, which maintained that extended limits could be equivalent, in the global military balance, to the loss of a half-dozen countries of the free world.

After the first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea failed, the General Assembly in 1958 debated whether to call a second one to address the unresolved issue of the breadth of the territorial sea. Canada decided to strongly advocate convening such a conference. As the delegate to the UN Committee where the issue was to be debated, the government sent a political appointee from the Senate assisted by a young foreign service officer just off probation — myself. The loneliness of the Canada representative in the Legal Committee stood in contrast to the hordes of Canadian diplomats milling around the seat of the Canadian representative in the Political Committee, occupied by the estimable John Holmes. Canada was, of course, at the height of its popularity in the UN as a middle power, but the disproportionality of the focus on the discussions on disarmament and peacekeeping in relation to the Law of the Sea spoke volumes about the priorities of the foreign ministry at the time. The magnetic pull of Canada's international vocation was overwhelming; the bread-and-butter issues had no pull at all.

A few days after the Law of the Sea debates began, the senator-envoy felt at a loss for lack of technical expertise. Neither he nor I were, of course, experts and there were intense corridor discussions occurring at the time on aspects of sea law. He asked me whether Ottawa would send down a senior expert from the Department of Fisheries and I wholeheartedly agreed that it should. This required the permission of John Holmes who rejected my written recommendations outright, without comment. Stung, I sought an explanation. The best I obtained was provided to me sometime later by another senior member of the

delegation. It was not considered appropriate, he said, to deal with contentious issues of a domestic character at the General Assembly.

This was idealism-based diplomacy in a microcosm.

If I dwell on the story, it is because the contrast between the buzz and excitement amid the Canadian throng dealing with the big, glamorous questions and the loneliness of the Canadian legal appointee struggling with a practical, domestically inspired one remained in my mind through the decades as a symbol of the department's approach to the priorities of Canadian foreign policy. In my first introduction to bipolarity, the compass pointed only in one direction.

Shortly afterwards, Canada began to organize an aggressive diplomatic global campaign in favour of a Canadian proposal for a six-mile territorial sea and further six-mile exclusive fishing zone. This was because the initiative was driven from the top by George Drew, Canadian high commissioner to London, whom the newly elected prime minister, John Diefenbaker, made head of the Canadian delegation to the Law of the Sea conferences, providing him with a free hand. The campaign was greeted with skepticism in the higher regions of the department, directed, as it was, against the position of our allies. Our then ambassador to Washington, Norman Robertson, ultimate mandarin of the era, was clearly uncomfortable and proposed that Canada accept the U.S. position recognizing foreign fishing rights in the outer zone. Drew ensured we did not. Canada finally worked out a compromise formula with the United States at the second conference, but it failed to obtain the necessary votes.

Canada had first embarked on its highly expansionist policy toward its adjacent coastal waters, of which the 12-mile territorial sea limit was only a part, after World War II. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent announced in 1949 Canada's intention to remove the high-seas status of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and declared the region Canadian internal waters. At the same time, he sought international recognition for so doing — an attempted land-grab, or more accurately water grab, of astonishing proportions. It was driven by the national interest, not idealism. Not surprisingly, it received no recognition.

That same year, as a part of Newfoundland's entry into Confederation, Canada announced its intention to declare internal the vast bays of Newfoundland. A decade later, as our appetite increased, the Canadian Government made public its intention to draw straight baselines closing Queen Charlotte Sound, Hecate Strait and Dixon Entrance off the West Coast, as well as all the channels between the islands of the Arctic Archipelago.

Under the Pearson government, Canada began a lengthy negotiation with the United States, led by then Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin (father of the current prime minister), to obtain U.S. recognition of

our claims. Because the U.S. would agree to nothing, the negotiations came to a complete impasse. In the early days of the Trudeau Government, Canadian officials devised an innovative approach that distinguished between territorial and functional jurisdiction: Canada would claim 200-mile zones for fisheries conservation purposes and pollution control. But because we feared that even these claims could be successfully challenged in international law, Canada withdrew its acceptance from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court regarding all matters relating to our adjacent coastal waters.

This action was strongly advocated by then undersecretary, Marcel Cadieux and his legal team, including myself. Paul Martin Sr. vigorously opposed it as not being consistent with Canada's support for international law. In this respect, he was right, of course, as well as being a harbinger of the spasms of idealistic foreign-policy that would bedevil us in the years to come.

Canada's only other choice was to drop at least some of our most bloated claims. In the face of strident political support on both coasts, the government was not prepared to do this. In renouncing recourse to law, Canada determined that its national interest, as it was conceived, took precedence over its commitment to broader international goals. There was no idealism involved in renouncing the Court's jurisdiction.

It is possible to argue that in defining our national interest in such a way as to place ourselves in opposition to virtually all our allies and to lead us to renounce the rule of law, Canada's approach was incompatible with our broader interests. But the desired expansion of our jurisdiction over vast areas of the high seas had deep roots in domestic politics on both the East and West coasts and was conducted as a separate diplomatic track without reference to our broader, idealistic foreign policy goals. Idealism and realism parted company. Canada was experiencing bipolarity in action.

Canada, India and Nigeria Walk Hand in Hand Into the Sunset

In the broad context of Canadian foreign policy at the time, the Law of the Sea initiative was more of a side show than a mainstream pursuit. In time however, there was to be a migration of the national-interest theme to the broad goals of our foreign policy. But this had to await the arrival on the scene of Pierre Trudeau some years later.

The two decades following World War II are sometimes called the "golden age" of Canadian diplomacy (Cohen, 2003, 5-21). Canada's standing was so high that it was called on to make contributions to keeping the

peace in a number of troubled areas including Pakistan, Korea, Palestine, Lebanon and Indochina. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Lester Pearson for his leadership in the creation of the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the crowning achievement of the period, brought Canada unprecedented recognition, but it also created in Canada a belief that we Canadians had a special calling to bring peace to the world and would as a matter of course, be the leader of middle powers showing the way (Stairs 2001a, 45–46).

The Department of External Affairs at the time contained a large number of creative individuals, men of strong egos and self-confidence. Norman Robertson, Escott Reid, Hume Wrong, Charles Ritchie, Arnold Smith, Jules Léger, Arnold Heeney, John Holmes, Chester Ronning, Marcel Cadieux and George Ignatieff in the older group; Robert Ford, Klaus Goldschlag, Ed Ritchie, Basil Robinson and Ross Campbell to name a few of the younger ones (Cohen 2003). Because the framework of thinking of the older group ante-dated the Cold War, many were independent-minded. At the height of the Cold War and decades before Ostpolitik, Norman Robertson advocated that Canada and the Western powers give diplomatic recognition to East Germany. This was equivalent, at the time, to thinking the unthinkable.

Almost without exception, these individuals had a strong sense of mission, or even a crusading impulse, descended as many were from men of the cloth or missionaries in the Far East. They were all strong Atlanticists.

[They were] motivated by a desire to bring the U.S. and Western Europe together in the pursuit of collective security. We wanted to prevent the Americans from doing what they had done a generation earlier: pick up their chips and withdraw from the world game. And we wanted a strong international organization for peace and security to avoid a repetition of the sorry story of the League of Nations, conscious, as we were, of our own sorry role in it. (Gotlieb 2004, 526).

It is true that many of those men were motivated, at least in part, by a sort of missionary zeal or impulse. There was an idealistic, romantic, almost crusading spirit that unleashed great energies in pursuit of a better world order. They were part of a generation that had made enormous sacrifices during the recent war and they formed the view that collective security, based on Anglo-American and European solidarity was vital to prevent yet another tragic descent into chaos and destruction. Our international security policies, as Denis Stairs has pointed out, were unabashedly linked to the national interest. As a result, it is probably true to say there never was a greater cor-

responsiveness between our idealistic goals and our basic national interest than at this time in our history.

It follows that in no sense were our diplomats during the "golden age" trying to differentiate Canada from the United States on the international plane. In helping to create NATO or resolve the Suez crisis — the defining event of the era for Canadian diplomacy — they were doing precisely the opposite. Working with the U.S. for a better world was the bedrock principle.

In the post-Suez years, as Canadian power inevitably declined in relation to a recovering Europe and an expanding world community, our greatest asset remained our reputation for moderate and constructive diplomacy, conducted by the "best foreign service in the world."

But it was already the case that our talent exceeded our influence.

John Diefenbaker, taking up office in the midst of post-Suez fever, believed he had to demonstrate that not just Pearson, but he and his government, too, could cut a swath on the international stage. They immediately solicited suggestions from every foreign service officer for "initiatives" that Canada could take on the international scene. Even at the bottom rung of the department, this struck us as a perversion of our true calling.

Diefenbaker's foreign initiatives did much to weaken Canada's international reputation — whether in the economic sphere, with his ill-considered suggestion for a 15 percent diversion of trade to Britain, or at the UN, where his personal initiative to condemn the Soviet Union for colonizing its East European neighbours aborted, or in East-West relations, when he questioned U.S. evidence of Soviet missiles in Cuba and called for an international inspection team to determine the facts.

Diefenbaker was too idiosyncratic to be characterized as a realist or idealist. However, there was no mistaking the outlook of his foreign minister, Howard Green. From the very outset of his term in office, he showed himself to be in the idealistic, crusading mould.

The Diefenbaker Government came to power at a time of rising national and international concern about nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war. In response to this new challenge, Howard Green relentlessly, even obsessively, pursued the cause of disarmament, casting the issues largely in a romantic, moralistic context. Believing, improbably, that the outcome of disarmament talks could have a major bearing on political issues in Canada, he travelled to Geneva to urge the Disarmament Committee to reach agreement on nuclear weapons in time to resolve a looming missile crisis in Cabinet that threatened the survival of his government. His sincerity was evident, but his preaching had no impact on the Americans, other than to annoy them. When he unilaterally proposed a ban on orbiting nuclear weapons in

outer space, the only effect was to delay the acceptance of his ambassador's credentials in Washington.

The foreign service idealists served the Diefenbaker Government as best they could, although some of the brightest and best were marginalized or made unwelcome. Some devoted their talents and energies to supporting Howard Green's peace initiative, although conscious of the short-term domestic political agenda it was meant to serve.

The failures of the Diefenbaker era simply added to the pressures when Lester Pearson became prime minister in 1963 for Canada to bolster its romantic vocation as a leader of middle powers and international peace broker *par excellence*. During the acrimonious years of the Vietnam War, the magnetic pole of Canada's international vocation pulled more strongly than ever. The new secretary of state for external affairs, a strong internationalist, thought he heard the drumbeat of public opinion. Canada, the message went, should be a player, a broker, a mediator. Paul Martin Sr. was vigorous in trying to turn a Nobel trick. He had enjoyed a foreign policy success a decade earlier in negotiating an end to the impasse that blocked the entry of new UN members. As foreign minister, he was successful in helping establish a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus. But with both eyes on succeeding Pearson as prime minister, he wanted further achievements to his credit.

Our role as the Western representative on the three-power International Control Commission for Vietnam fed Martin's expectations. In arranging the secret mission to Hanoi of Chester Ronning (code-name Smallbridge), and agreeing to the mission to Hanoi of Blair Seaborn (code-name Bacon) Canada was being helpful to the United States, but these efforts served mainly to reinforce domestic demands that our role be more significant. The belief ran high that, if only we tried harder, Pearsonian-style diplomacy would show that we remained a natural leader among nations.

In the foreign service, there was a feeling that there was something almost frantic in this desire. A growing nucleus feared there were serious consequences to overplaying Canada's role as honest broker or helpful fixer and exaggerating what Canada could contribute to the big issues of peace and war. We were not alone in believing that Canada was straining itself to do good works. Writing at the time about our unrelieved internationalism, the Times of London described "the rosy vision of Canada, Nigeria and India, walking hand in hand into the sunset, doing good among the poor and giving wise counsel to the wicked powers." Uncharitable perhaps, but in the eyes of the realist school burgeoning in the department, not altogether inaccurate.

Describing the disappointment of Canadians about our place in the world, I wrote a private memorandum, when I was departmental Legal

Adviser, along with a colleague, Max Yalden, to Pierre Trudeau, minister of justice, in the late autumn of 1967, observing that:

To many Canadians, Canada has a moral obligation to help solve the problems of the world. Our culture, our character, our geographic location, our prosperity — all these and other factors have been thought to combine to endow us with a special role in helping to bring peace and sanity to the world.

What makes the decline of this role particularly serious for Canada is that it played an important part in forging our unity in the post-war era. Like the Danes who made good furniture, the French who made good wine, the Russians who made sputnik, Canada, as a specially endowed middle power, as the reasonable man's country, as the broker or the skilled intermediary, made peace.

The problem was that expectations of Canadians about their role in the world had become gravely exaggerated and could not be realized. "The case for realism in our foreign policy," the memorandum concluded, "derives much of its urgency and strength from an appreciation of the consequences of national policies based upon immature or unreal concepts of internationalism. False internationalism leads to disillusionment and the consequences of disillusionment are isolationism and withdrawal."

The Assault on Canada; National Unity and the National Interest

The cry for greater realism was fuelled by a growing threat to Canada's survival as a state — a threat that came to absorb the energy of Canadian politicians and diplomats for almost the next two decades. Instead of focusing on saving the world, Canadian diplomacy had to be directed to an entirely new task — saving Canada. The unity and integrity of Canada brought the national interest to centre-stage in Canadian foreign policy where it was to remain for a number of years.

In 1965, the government of Jean Lesage in Quebec claimed that the province had the right to make treaties in areas under its domestic jurisdiction. The reaction of Lester Pearson and his Cabinet was flaccid. They appeared willing to delegate to Quebec, through external treaties with France and Belgium, for example, and through internal accords, the right to make treaties, provided there was formal federal sanction.

Under the leadership of Marcel Cadieux, eventually supported by a wavering Paul Martin Sr., the Pearson government reversed its stand, drawing the line at the France-Quebec agreements in the area of education and culture. But France, working with select senior officials in the Quebec government, began a campaign to provide recognition of Quebec's sovereign status internationally.

After the prime minister declared de Gaulle's behaviour in Montreal in 1967 "unacceptable," the two countries were in a state of diplomatic warfare. France's principal method of supporting Quebec's succession was through constructing new international institutions among its former African colonies that would accord Quebec representation independently of Canada.

There followed one of the most remarkable periods in Canadian diplomatic history. What other country experienced a prolonged attempt by a friendly ally to dismember it? The political and constitutional struggle reached into the capitals of Europe and Africa. The campaign for diplomatic recognition, initially driven by de Gaulle himself, continued years after his death (Bosher 1999; Black 1996; Bastien 1999).

The challenge brought the national interest, as never before or since, to the central core of our foreign policy. Even before Pierre Trudeau became prime minister, the iron-willed Marcel Cadieux drove far-reaching changes in Canada's presence in the world. Embassies were opened in French-speaking African states, official aid programs and cultural activities were initiated in those countries, the composition of Canada's international delegations changed and Canada became a leader in designing the new international francophone organization.

Canada's success in frustrating the French strategy was one of our greatest diplomatic achievements. Had the French succeeded in de-legitimizing the federal government's authority to represent Quebec in the francophone world, the Canadian constitution would have been rewritten, and Quebec would have achieved recognition as a sovereign member of the international community. Yet the battle was seen at the time as an obscure three-way struggle among Ottawa, Quebec and Paris that had little to do with the main currents of Canadian foreign policy.

Within the foreign ministry, reality hit home when Cadieux, in a move to gain control over the accommodationists, led by the ambassador to France, Jules Leger, directed that all communications from political divisions relating to France had to pass through a special office he created to address the threat — euphemistically called the Special Adviser for Federal-Provincial relations (Barry and Hilliker 1995). Political relations became expressly subordinated to constitutional imperatives.

Pierre Trudeau's determination to fight French interference and Quebec separatist thrusts in Africa — such as his decision to send a signal through francophone Africa by suspending diplomatic relations with Gabon — profoundly influenced the reformulation of Canadian foreign policy in the massive review he ordered after becoming prime minister in 1968. It led to the articulation of a new approach to Canada's foreign relations.

Trudeau's Compass Swings Both Ways

In *Federalism and International Relations*, a document prepared under the aegis of Pierre Trudeau in the context of the constitutional discussions of the time,² the government stated Canada's foreign policy should project internationally its character as a federal and bilingual country and reflect the priorities that flowed from these constitutional realities (Martin, Sr. 1968). Tellingly, the first paragraph of the statement was entitled, "Foreign Policy as an Expression of the National Interest."

The new approach to Canadian foreign policy, as expressed in *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, the six-booklet document published in 1970 (Sharp 1970), migrated from the constitutional statement in *Federalism and International Relations* to the foreign policy review. *Foreign Policy for Canadians* defined Canada's foreign policy as "the product of the government's progressive definition and pursuit of national aims and interests in the international environment." Reflecting our contemporaneous efforts to fight separatism internationally and assert far-reaching claims to maritime jurisdiction, the White Paper declared that Canadian foreign policy is "the extension abroad of national policies (9)." "Canada's foreign policy" it specified, "derives its content and validity from the degree of relevance it has to national interests and basic aims (11)."

The goals were worked into a conceptual framework embracing six broad policy themes: Fostering Economic Growth, Safeguarding Sovereignty and Independence, Working for Peace and Security, Promoting Social Justice, Enhancing the Quality of Life, and Ensuring a Harmonious Natural Environment. In spite of the idealistic associations of some of these themes, the document categorically emphasized the national interest as a basis for Canada's role in the world.

Traditionalists in the foreign ministry were far from happy about the Trudeau foreign policy review. Anticipating the demands of the new government, the department had, prior to Trudeau's becoming prime minister,

2 The document was followed by *Federalism and International Conferences on Education*.

originated its own foreign policy review, led by Norman Robertson, then at the end of his career. (It produced the response, according to one critic, that "essentially, all was for the best in the best of all foreign ministries" [Malone 2001].) The Trudeau review was far more ambitious, but its results were in many ways problematic. One may surmise that this was a consequence of the need to take account of the department's traditional idealistic views in framing a coherent national-interest-based document.

The goals of Trudeau's White Paper were so generalized that they arguably lacked content. The document mysteriously declared that the "correct focus" in our foreign policy "can only be achieved if all the elements of a foreign policy question can be looked at in a conceptual framework" (Sharp 1970, 14). Everything was interrelated, though Sovereignty and Independence and Peace and Security were placed well down the list. The entire exercise neglected to address Canada's relations with the U. S., relying on the notion that our policies towards the United States were to be understood as a dimension of "the many issues raised throughout the papers" (41). The analysis, far from clarifying priorities, led to a semantic quagmire.

Was anything new or useful being said? The fact is that the Trudeau review did reflect a significant change of emphasis in our foreign policy towards realism and away from the honest-broker or save-the-world role. Not surprisingly, Lester Pearson was unhappy about the review in that it failed to make the pursuit of peace and security Canada's highest priority (Bothwell forthcoming).

The conceptual and abstract quality of the goals in the White Paper prefigured the contradictions that were to emerge in Trudeau's stewardship of Canada's international relations. Over a period of years, he swung between the role of aggressive protector of Canada's national interest and champion of the third-world and nuclear disarmament.

In early years, realism could be seen as a guiding principle, extending well beyond the strategies adopted to preserve Canadian unity. It was a basic factor in the cabinet's decision to reduce by half our military presence in Europe. (The thinking was that the troops could be used closer to home to defend sovereignty and play other similar roles.) It was emphatically in play when Trudeau boldly recognized Communist China, whose wheat purchases were having a dramatic impact on the Western Canadian economy. It was evident in the opening of diplomatic relations with the Vatican, in the creation of a satellite capacity to counter French attempts to forge transatlantic satellite links with Quebec, in the assertion of jurisdiction unilaterally over vast areas of the high seas, as well as in placing reservations to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

The call in the White Paper for developing "countervailing factors" in our relations with the United States found full expression two years later, when External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp published the Third Option (Sharp 1972), which proposed diversification of Canada's economic relations with Europe and Japan as a way of reducing our dependence on the U.S. The Third Option was primarily an expression of domestic policy in that it called for strengthening the public instruments that would enable Canada to gain greater control over its economy. It was a remarkable policy for dealing with the U.S. because it was a policy for not dealing with the U.S.

As an exercise in economic nationalism designed to strengthen Canada's sovereignty and control over its economic destiny, the Third Option reflected the realist school's view of what the purpose of foreign policy should be. It was not adopted to save the world or advance Canada's internationalist aspirations, but to strengthen and support our independence. It proved to be a flawed policy, inspired by misguided views about the national interest. Its principal associated domestic policies which, in time, were the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) and the National Energy Program (NEP), did not survive the Trudeau era, and trade, far from becoming more diversified under Trudeau's government, grew even more dependent on the U.S. market.

As the years passed, Canada's foreign policy under Trudeau increasingly took on the crusading, moralistic, save-the-world overtones that belied the explicit focus on the national interest of his White Paper. It is hard to believe that it was the same prime minister who, in his White Paper, defined foreign policy as "the extension abroad of national policies," and then delivered the Mansion House speech in London five years later in which he called for a new "global ethic" to end the present "imbalance in the basic human condition, an imbalance in access to health care, to a nutritious diet, to shelter, to education, one that extends to all space and through all time" (Head and Trudeau 1995).

Trudeau became in time the leading *tier-mondist* and proponent of the North-South Dialogue among the industrialized countries and in the Commonwealth. His swan song, the peace initiative of 1983, supported by a cheer-leading Canadian media, was overreaching and led nowhere.

But something of the hard-core national interest remained. While actively promoting North-South themes, the cabinet endorsed the initiative of his foreign minister, Mark MacGuigan, in 1981 in favour of a strategy of "bilateralism," which called for Canada to give "concentrated attention to a select number of countries." MacGuigan regarded this strategy as standing in sharp contrast to Trudeau's multilateral adventures, what he saw as a matter of personal indulgence (MacGuigan 2002). Originally advocated

some dozen years earlier in the Gottlieb-Yalden memorandum to Trudeau as a correction to over-emphasis on multilateralism, bilateralism had made its way into Trudeau's Third Option as the key international component of strategy.

For all his international peregrinations and Third World advocacy, Trudeau never shed himself of skepticism about Canada's potential role in the world. It was difficult to persuade him to visit the UN and on rare occasions when he did, such as to address the UN Disarmament Commission, it was only after strenuous efforts to convince him he would have something important to say. In launching his peace initiative, he was skeptical about what he could expect to achieve, yielding to the persuasion of political advisers who saw great credit to be earned for a party unpopular at the time.

This skepticism was not surprising in someone whose world view was shaped by a hard, almost nineteenth-century sense of reality. *Realpolitik* was at the heart of his view of the world. He believed the world was dominated by great powers, which required their spheres of influence for peaceful cohabitation. Probably for this reason his voice was muted when it came to criticizing Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe, and even Afghanistan. In his years in office it is difficult to find any statement critical of the Soviet Union. For that matter, he was reluctant to publicly criticize U.S. activities in Central America.

The legacy of the Trudeau years was a foreign policy that swung erratically between the poles of aggressive nationalism and unrealistic internationalism. The compass jerks from pole to pole. For Trudeau, one day it was brass-knuckles realism, the next, feel-good idealism. The contradictions in the style, substance and expression of his foreign policy cannot be resolved. The symptoms of bi-polarism grew more prominent than ever.

But the focus of the national interest, especially as it affected Canada's relationship with the United States, was to demonstrate growing resonance in the incoming government of Brian Mulroney.

The National Interest in the Mulroney Years: Canada-U.S. Relations Take Centre Stage

The new Progressive Conservative prime minister's principal priority in foreign affairs was refurbishing relations with the United States, which he made part of his campaign platform. Trudeau's nationalist policies, in particular the NEP and FIRA, were viewed as helpful neither to the Canadian economy nor to Canada-U.S. relations. The Liberal leader's tendency to find moral equivalence between the two superpowers, particularly at a time when

Ronald Reagan was declaring the Soviet Union to be an evil empire, was deeply resented in the White House. The goals of Mulroney's foreign policy were thus grounded in a clear view of the national interest from which he never wavered in his two terms as prime minister.

The bed-rock reality principle was that the U.S. was friend and ally and not a power against which one sought counterweights. It was a foreign policy that he would direct himself, rather than through his foreign minister, Joe Clark.

Within weeks of taking office, Mulroney went to Washington to meet Reagan, against the unanimous counsel of his advisers in Ottawa. This set the stage for the reality-based style and substance of his leadership. He immersed himself not only in designing the grand strategies, but in most specific tactical considerations, especially as they related to Congress.

His shift from multilateralism to bilateralism in relations with the United States was a departure of historic proportions. From the outset of its post-war role, Canada had been a vigorous advocate of lowering tariffs and other barriers to trade through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and multilateral trade negotiations. To conclude that a continental arrangement with the U.S. was the best way to obtain increased access to American markets marked a major breach with Canada's traditional preference for multilateral solutions. It is true that in 1965, Canada entered into the Auto Pact with the U.S., a bilateral agreement. But it was limited to a single sector of the economy and was a clear exception to our multilateral orientation. As Robert Bothwell points out, it was also a U.S.-inspired initiative (Bothwell forthcoming).

The view that Canada's interests should be advanced in multilateral bodies where we were not required to deal one-on-one with the United States, was a core belief of Canada's negotiators, a natural extension of the Canadian commitment to multilateralism generally. But while the exclusive reliance on global negotiations served Canada's national interest for many years, the view began to gain credence among Canadian officials in the late Trudeau years that a different approach was necessary to secure our ever-growing U.S. market. An attempt under Trudeau to negotiate sectoral free-trade agreements reflected this shift towards continentalism, though the initiative was ill-thought out and aborted.

Assisted by the support of the Macdonald Commission for a Canada-U.S. free trade agreement (Canada 1985b), and by the positive effects of the Auto Pact, the Mulroney government pursued continental free-trade to a successful conclusion. Conducting high-level personal diplomacy, Mulroney was able to achieve his other two objectives as well, an acid-rain accord with President George Bush Sr. and an agreement with Reagan on the passage of

U.S. vessels through Arctic waters, providing increased recognition of Canada's claim to sovereignty.

Notwithstanding the prime minister's determination that a continentalist approach was necessary to advance our national interest, it was inevitable that his new Progressive Conservative government would want to conduct its own general foreign policy review, which it did under the aegis of Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark.

The results of the exercise, conducted through a parliamentary committee with public participation (Canada 1985a), were published in a Green Paper which failed to highlight Mulroney's reality-based priority — restoring the Canada-U.S. economic relationship. That was predictable, given the continued prominence of a romantic view of Canadian foreign policy among many pundits and much of the public.

Clark's approach to his portfolio arguably did break some new ground. While reflecting much of the idealistic, romantic view of Canada's role in the world, there was new emphasis placed on Central America and security issues in the hemisphere, with a corresponding downgrading of Canadian interest in the European countries. Clark seemed to have an almost visceral suspicion of the Europeans (other than the British). But the decline in Atlanticism was almost inevitable in view of the increasing tendency of Europe to look inward as it devoted its energy towards the progressive achievement of economic and political union. Europe's success in achieving integration had important implications for Canada in that it shrunk the political space in which the country had successfully operated as a middle power (Van Oudenaren 2004).

It can be argued that Canada pursued a two-track foreign policy in the Mulroney years — the prime minister's continental, national-interest track and Joe Clark's internationalist track.

Joe Clark's track did not include the United States. He barely got involved, so completely did the U.S. become the domain of the prime minister. Clark's predecessor, Alan MacEachen, foreign minister in the Trudeau Government, spent a large amount of his time working on the relationship with his counterpart, George Shultz. To the extent Joe Clark did focus on the grand U.S. strategy, he supported those looking for counterweights. In a key battle, he supported an attempt by Flora MacDonald, the culture minister, to Canadianize film distribution. When it became clear to the prime minister that, thanks to the power of Hollywood-on-the-Potomac, Canada could have a free trade agreement or Canadian distribution of American movies, but not both, her campaign collapsed.

Central America during the Mulroney years had become a front line in the Cold War. The region was in turmoil, racked with strife and civil wars in

El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras. Responding to strong pressures from non-governmental organizations, Clark involved himself actively in regional peacemaking efforts (Ross 2001, 75–93). His visits to the area and criticisms of U.S. policy there gave Canada a higher profile in the region than it ever had before. His efforts to save Central America from the scourge of war and his emphasis on addressing the root causes of regional conflict annoyed the Americans, but had little impact on the peace process.

On the economic front, by contrast, Clark's western hemispheric focus did prove to be largely compatible with Mulroney's more realist priorities. Reversing its long-standing abstention from membership in the Organization of American States (OAS), Canada joined as a full participant in 1989 and, for the first time, contributed to regional peacekeeping efforts (Ross 2001, 84–85).³ The government, after initially remaining aloof from Mexico's free-trade initiative, soon saw its national interest as better served by being part of NAFTA. By the end of the Mulroney mandate, Canadian policies toward North American economic integration and larger hemispheric cooperation were very much in line.

Outside the new hemispheric interest, Mulroney's foreign policy maintained a strong focus on international issues (Michaud and Nossal 2001). As was to be expected, Canada remained committed to its role as peacekeeper *par excellence*, devoting resources to conflict resolution in Bosnia and Somalia and to the U.S.-led campaign in the first Gulf War.

An idealistic — and most would say commendable — streak was visible in Mulroney's vigorous, though unsuccessful, attempt to persuade Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher to support sanctions against South Africa. Unlike Trudeau, he was outspoken on human rights violations (in China, Kenya, Indonesia) and could thus be said to have placed new emphasis on humanitarian values in Canadian foreign policy, even claiming that human rights and good governance was a "cornerstone of our foreign policy" (Michaud and Nossal 2001, 19).

It is an overstatement, however, to argue as some commentators have, that the seeds of Lloyd Axworthy's human-security agenda (Ross 2001, Keating and Gecelovsky 2001) were laid by Mulroney. There is a vast difference between a foreign policy that makes specific humanitarian concerns, along with the promotion of national interests, a component of its international goals and a foreign policy that makes the universal advancement of human security its core objective. The first reflects a realistic assessment of a coun-

3 It should be noted, however, that while Canada joined the OAS it still has not signed the American Convention on Human Rights, a basic regional constitutive document.

try's capacity to achieve a specific goal. The second is a policy that is a distraction from the national interest because the generality of its goals makes it unachievable.

It is fair to conclude that, under Mulroney, Canada followed a reality-based foreign policy. There were few strains between the polar attractions of the national interest and an activist global role. In rooting national interest in North American soil, in Canada-U.S. friendship, and in enthusiastically engaging with the U.S. on international issues, Canada's global role was enhanced; there was no sense of Canada's seeking internationally to offset U.S. power.

That coherence was in marked contrast to the role of Canada in the world that was to emerge under the government of Jean Chrétien.

The Cold War Ends

I retired from Canada's foreign service within days of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement's taking effect. The Berlin Wall was about to come down, the Soviet Empire to collapse and the Cold War to end. George Bush Sr. pronounced — prematurely — the arrival of a "new international order," and there was high optimism that, with improved Great Power harmony, the Security Council would be restored to its rightful place in maintaining international peace and security.

The moment was a promising one for Canada. Freed from the regimen of the Cold War, it was to be expected that allies of the United States would have more room to pursue their own policies rather than ones that were alliance driven. Gone was the iron framework in which for four decades all big issues, from nuclear disarmament to regional wars, had to be addressed.

More than a framework, the Cold War had been a vise that applied pressure on all allies to accept U.S. positions on major issues. This was not to be deplored. The Western industrialized democracies were engaged in a historic battle with a totalitarian state that reigned over the greatest land empire in history. Although the U.S. was emerging from the Cold War as the dominant nation in the international system, an era of creative collaboration could be foreseen in building the new international order, free from military alliances and fear of nuclear wars.

In the Alan B. Plaunt Memorial Lecture in 1989, I spoke of the prospect of a new era in Canadian foreign policy. I said then:

Canadians, in the historic election of 1988, chose the path of free trade and institution building with the U.S. Canada decided to see the U.S. not primarily as a threat from which we must have protection, but as our

comparative advantage in the world. The improved and more secure access we have achieved has become a part of our international comparative advantage.

As I see the event, and I realize that we are perhaps too close to see it clearly, the adoption of the Free Trade Agreement exorcises a strong negative factor in the Canadian psyche: a fear of the U.S. and its influence.

In opting to see the U.S. relationship as a positive asset that needs to be preserved and enhanced, we have liberated ourselves and our foreign policy from overwhelming American preoccupations — and even obsessions. Perhaps we are now liberated, so to speak, to get on with other challenges on the international plane and to our larger role (Gotlieb 2004).

As I was soon to realize, I was partly right, but mostly wrong.

The Chrétien Approach to the National Interest: Team Canada at Centre Stage

In a habit of Canadian political life that had become addictive, the Chrétien government did not long delay in conducting its own, *de rigueur* foreign policy review.⁴ Predictably, the review of 1994/1995, *Canada in the World* (Canada 1994), reflected both faces of Canadian foreign policy: security and prosperity on the one hand, and Canadian values, such as good governance, the rule of law and democracy and the need to project them abroad, on the other. As it turns out, the government of Jean Chrétien did strike out in new directions and we did get on with seeking a "larger role." But far from liberating ourselves and our foreign policy from overwhelming U.S. preoccupation, the demon of anti-Americanism cast a large shadow over our international ventures in the Chrétien years.

Anti-Americanism was hardly a new factor in Canadian foreign policy (Granatstein 1996). Well before the Cold War ended, there was a growing tendency in Canadian diplomacy to want to differentiate ourselves from the U.S. on the world stage. Notwithstanding its ostensible grounding in the national interest, *Foreign Policy for Canadians* had advocated support for counterweights to the U.S. and the Third Option was designed for this purpose (Sharp 1972). For many in the foreign ministry, differentiation from the Americans evolved into an ingredient of our national identity.

4 See Malone (2001) for a detailed account of the process.

The practice developed in the Department of External Affairs of keeping a "differentiation scoreboard." We would tally our votes at the UN and compare them to other U.S. allies, such as Britain, France, Germany and Japan. If we were criticized for being too close to Uncle Sam, we could demonstrate we voted with the Yanks less often than other allies.

Although international circumstances were favourable, Canada, as it turned out, was not about to enter a new golden age of diplomacy. A new flare-up of the conflict between the realist and romantic views of Canada's role in the world precluded it. The Chrétien government's approach to foreign policy was to be characterized first by a profound lack of coherence, then by an increased anti-American inflection which led us to adopt a quixotic international role, notably different from the heyday of Canadian diplomacy. As well, an excessive preoccupation with the projection of Canadian values as a goal of foreign policy emerged.

During most of the Chrétien era, our foreign policy could have been mistaken for that of two countries. On the one hand, there was the prime minister's single-minded devotion to pursuing trade promotion around the globe; on the other, his foreign minister's crusade for human security. The poles of Canadian foreign policy were never further apart.

On economic matters, the prime minister's approach could be seen as grounded in the national interest. Almost immediately after the Liberals won the 1993 election and Chrétien became prime minister, he threw to the winds his commitment as leader of the opposition to renegotiate NAFTA. Under his leadership, the government entered into free-trade agreements with Chile and Israel and became a leading proponent of free trade throughout the Americas.

During the next decade, the prime minister led a series of Team Canada delegations of business executives and officials that circled the globe selling Canadian goods and services. "As the government was slashing budgets," one observer remarked, "no expense was spared on Team Canada as it became the face of Canada abroad" (Cohen 2003, 113). With all the fanfare of an organized circus, the Team Canada mission to China, its second, comprised a delegation of 600 businessman, officials and staff. Grand and lucrative deals were announced, but whether these actually produced a significant increase in Canadian exports is debatable (Cohen 2003).

Even on the economic front, one might well ask if there wasn't something of the feel-good, rather than the do-good, approach to Canadian foreign policy in Chrétien's Team Canada. While no doubt motivated to promote real Canadian interests, it is difficult to avoid wondering whether Chrétien's show-boat diplomacy paid more than lip service to the goals of economic growth, productivity and prosperity. Were they an example of

something peripheral, or optional, in Canadian foreign policy, rather than central to it (Stairs 2001b)?

What is not in doubt is that for many years, Team Canada became the centrepiece of Chrétien's foreign policy. To a close reader of *Canada and the World* (Canada 1995), this could come as something of a surprise. As has been pointed out, there is but one reference to Canada's national interest in the document (Nossal 2003).

The prime minister's travelling teams generated endless favourable publicity. They cast an image of a foreign policy devoted to creating economic opportunities for Canadians, conducted in a manner reflecting unity and national purpose — altogether a good thing. That there was so little criticism seemed to reflect an opinion among Canadians that the prime minister was doing exactly what he should be doing: promoting economic growth.

The popularity of his down-to-earth approach was also seen in the wildly favourable reaction of Canadians to the behaviour of Minister of Fisheries Brian Tobin, in what became known as the turbot war off Canada's East Coast in 1995. Not only were Canadians ecstatic about our probably illegal arrest of a Spanish trawler in international waters,⁵ they were supine when Canada again renounced the International Court's jurisdiction.

Lloyd Axworthy: The Copernicus of International Relations?

During this time, Chrétien's longest serving foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, soon after his appointment in 1996, began to carve out what has been described as "arguably the most ambitious agenda of any foreign minister in history" (Hay 1999, 228). "In putting people at the heart of security policy, Axworthy's vision," in the words of Canada's former ambassador to the United Nations, Paul Heinbecker, "was virtually Copernican in its significance" (Heinbecker 2004).

Notwithstanding its roots in the idealism of Canada's diplomat-missionaries of an earlier era, it differed in significant ways from past Canadian foreign policy. Unlike earlier Canadian diplomats born in the manse, who tended to be practical in their outlook, Axworthy articulated his vision in the broadest possible terms, often engaging in what his critics have called full-blown "pulpit diplomacy" (Hampson and Oliver 1999). As one astute foreign-service practitioner remarked, Axworthy "seemed genuinely to believe

5 Polls showed support for the arrest of the trawler at 84 percent in Quebec and 94 percent in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. See Stairs (2003, 14) citing Harris (1998, 7).

that dealing with issues and problems in speeches was tantamount to addressing them substantively" (Copeland 2001).

From Axworthy's foreign policy, the prime minister seemed to stand aloof. As another critic has put it: "Untrammelled by close prime ministerial supervision, human security came to dominate the rhetoric and flavour of policy in a manner unprecedented in the Canadian experience" (Hillmer and Chapnick 2001, 18).

Canada, of course, continued at the same time to pursue its peacekeeping and peacemaking vocation in the world's increasing number of failed states and other hot spots.

Until 1990, Canada had participated in every UN peacekeeping activity and under Chrétien, it strained itself to maintain that role in the last decade of the century. In the NATO-authorized operation in Kosovo and in the UN operation in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia, Canadian forces were active participants. There was no diminution in our self-identification as the world's foremost peacekeeper.

This identification, however, was grounded ever more in the romantic vision of ourselves and ever less in reality. The story is now well-told (Cohen 2003, Granatstein 2003), though still insufficiently appreciated, of the decline in our defense spending, our aid programs and the capacity of our armed forces to conduct various roles. Compared to a level of defense spending of some 7.3 percent of GDP in the 1950s and some 0.53 percent of GDP in official aid in the 1970s, expenditures declined to a fraction of that by century's end — 1.1 percent of GDP on defense and some 0.22 percent on aid.

Canadian spending on defense ranked Canada among the lowest three members of NATO, along with Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and 17th in the world in terms of official aid. From being the largest contributor to peacekeeping in the 1970s and 1980s, Canada declined to 32nd in the world by the end of 2001. By 2003, Canada had only 250 military and civilian personnel in UN peacekeeping operations. In Granatstein's assessment: "By the beginning of the current century, shortages of equipment and personnel all but eliminated Canada's military capacity" (Granatstein 2003).

Even the budget of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade shrank by almost a third in the early Chrétien years (Hampson, Hillmer and Molot 2001b). But the enfeeblement of our global capabilities found no change in our self-proclaimed mission to the world, other than in terminology. Lloyd Axworthy proclaimed Canada's "soft-power" as the basis of our international influence (Axworthy 2003).

As Foreign Minister Bill Graham put it in 2002: "For many Canadians, and in the eyes of the world, peacekeeping is fundamental to who we are as a nation. I am proud to affirm that the maintenance of peace remains our

highest aspiration" (Graham 2002a). Yet it was on the watch of the government of which he was a member that the resources behind Canada's soft power declined precipitously. How could this be our highest aspiration, if there was no willingness to increase the resources necessary to achieve it? This was another contradiction in Canada's foreign policy of the era.

There were others. Axworthy's human security agenda, which he sought to implement through soft power, led to great emphasis on the projection abroad of Canadian values. This translated into advocacy of the rule of law and international rule-making, a main object being to constrain the United States in its international behaviour. Yet there was no evidence that new regimes of law would influence U.S. conduct. The U.S., through refusing to ratify several new treaties, made it perfectly clear they would not.

Still, under Lloyd Axworthy, Canada set itself out to be, in that frightful phrase, a "norm-entrepreneur," the purpose of the rules being to fulfill "the responsibility to protect" the victimized of the world (Riddell-Dixon 2004). "Canada became 'a world leader' in advocating international human-rights norms" (Riddell-Dixon 2004). Axworthy energetically promoted the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention of 1997 and the Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998, and he vigorously advocated treaties to prohibit small arms and protect children in time of conflict. Canada was vigorous in criticizing the U.S. refusal to adhere to these treaties and others, such as the Kyoto Protocol, the statute of the International Criminal Court and the banning of chemical and biological weapons.

There is no doubt that the Axworthy approach to foreign policy had deep roots in our past, reflecting the longstanding visionary or missionary impulse in our foreign policy. But because of its conceptual underpinnings, and its focus on the rule of law, it was not really in the Pearsonian tradition, which was always pragmatic and closely tied to Canadian interests. Axworthy saw modern civilization — as he explained in *Navigating a New World*, his account of his years as foreign minister — as engaged in a "transformative clash" between two great forces or "global networks." One was the way of the fanatic, terrorist or extremist, "drawing strength from the dispossessed of the world"; the other was "the way of the warrior," that is, the world's most powerful nation, the United States. The third way was to build, through norms and rules, the human security network for the protection of the world's victims.

Canada, he asserted, was ideally suited to being a leader of the third way, rallying global networks and resisting militarism. "We have the right stuff," he wrote, "to be agents of change" (Axworthy 2003). In Axworthy's world view, there is no real doubt about who were the good guys and who

the bad. He saw the United States as a treaty-breaker, seeking to impose military solutions.

The third way represented, in essence, a Utopian vision of Canada's role, or more accurately, a quixotic one, distinguished from Canada's traditional approach to its international vocation by abandoning the concerns of the realist school. In seeking to transform the behaviour of other states, its aims were ill-defined, overreaching and by and large impossible of fulfillment. In his hands, Canada's aspirations in earlier times to be an "honest broker" or "helpful fixer" metastasized into an all-embracing, world-transforming vision, where states were subordinated to a higher ethic and rule of law, monitored by an assembly of all nations, elected directly by the people, which would ensure the security of all human beings.

The Pearsonian tradition was based on a recognition that Canadian interests were served by being helpful to our allies in conflicts that could upset the broader peace (Stairs 2003, 43–44). At the peak of its influence, the Canadian strength was in addressing threats to the peace through resourceful and innovative diplomacy and negotiations. There was little affection for international law in the external affairs department.

Unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations, the UN Charter avoided conditioning intervention on legal concepts such as acts of "external aggression."⁶ In the Department of External Affairs, the memory was strong of all the useless treaties adopted in the inter-war years which purported to make recourse to war illegal. The disrepute international law had fallen into the inter-war years was reflected in the almost invisible role played by lawyers in the most creative days of Canadian diplomacy.⁷

The Chrétien Doctrine: No UN, No Legitimacy

Never in the history of Canada's foreign relations had differentiation from the United States become a greater imperative than under Axworthy's stewardship. It was no less than a prerequisite for navigating the third way. For-

6 Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations reads: [Members] "undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members." (League of Nations 1921).

7 During the inter-war years, Nobel prizes were awarded to those responsible for the myriad of bilateral treaties (the Pacts of Paris, the Kellogg-Briand agreements), making resort to war illegal. These were being adopted when the European powers were engaged in appeasement and rearmament that led headlong to war. Through encouraging complacency, these norms about the illegality of war may even have contributed to its inevitability.

tunately, the emphasis on soft power, "human security networks" and the third way found no resonance with his successor, down-to-earth, practical minded John Manley, whose objective was restoring good relations with the U.S. During the all-too-short term of his stewardship, the needle of the foreign policy compass swung dramatically from feel-good vision to do-good practicalities like managing the Canada-U.S. border.

But declarations about how quickly the Axworthy legacy seemed to be fading proved to be premature, to say the least (Hampson, Osler and Oliver 1998). Under Manley's successor, Bill Graham, there was yet another foreign policy review in 2003 — *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy* (Canada 2003) — and the government again placed great stress on projecting Canadian values, humanitarian goals and peacekeeping. The needle shifted back yet again to the visionary, feel-good side of a foreign policy conducted, if not in opposition to Washington, at least at some distance from it.

Thus in the later years of his government, Chrétien, at the helm of Canadian foreign policy, distanced Canada from the U.S. on Iraq. The rationale for his decision, the "Chrétien Doctrine" as I called it (Gotlieb 2003b), was that Canada would never engage in enforcement action unless the UN authorized it. The Chrétien doctrine broke new ground in Canadian foreign policy. Half a decade earlier, Canada had joined a NATO-sponsored armed intervention in Kosovo without the authority of the UN Security Council.

It is possible that Chrétien used lack of UN authorization for the Iraq invasion as a fig leaf to disguise his true but unarticulated reasons for Canada's non-participation. However, in ceding, or appearing to cede, to the UN the determination of our national security interests, the prime minister went some distance towards positioning the Axworthy vision of the third way in the mainstream of Canadian foreign policy.

Paradoxically, he was also articulating a foreign policy for turning inward. Because Security Council agreement to authorize armed intervention in areas of conflict and human rights violations will remain a rare occurrence, the Chrétien doctrine enables Canada to justify non-involvement regardless of moral principles that may call for intervention. It thus can serve as a cover for a policy of isolationism.

Chrétien's reluctance to criticize offensive comments about the United States made by his colleagues and other insiders helped distance Canada further from Washington than at any time since the John Diefenbaker era. Moreover, as in Trudeau's career, late vintage Chrétien took on the role of a *tier-mondist*, championing the cause of Africa at G-7 (see Cohen 2003, 97) and Commonwealth summits. Although Canada's military assistance to the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan mitigated somewhat the effects of Ottawa's gen-

erally critical posture, relations between the Canadian prime minister and the U.S. president became more strained than at any time in decades.

There was arguably more coherence, less polarity and fewer contradictions in Canadian foreign policy at the end of the Chrétien era than during most of the years of his leadership. The romantic view held unchallenged ascendancy. Although Lloyd Axworthy was no longer his foreign minister, Chrétien became at one with him in positioning Canada outside the orbit of Washington and in downgrading concerns about the impact of our policies on Canada-U.S. relations.

By the end of Chrétien's period in office, the pillars of our foreign policy identified in his review of 1994/1995 — national security, economic growth and projection of Canadian values — seemed to be metamorphosing into new pillars: differentiation from the U.S., and international rule-making. In two decades, Canada went from honest broker to norm-entrepreneur, from doing good to feeling good in foreign policy.

In terms of Canada's role in the world, more coherence did not mean more effectiveness. Disassociating ourselves from the United States, emphasizing rule-making, and refraining from international enforcement action except in the unlikely event of Great Power unanimity, was a successful recipe for Canadian marginalization on the world stage.

With declining influence in Washington, neglect of the military, and emphasis on projecting our virtues and values, Canadians, at the end of the Chrétien decade, had little reason to believe their country any longer influenced the major issues of the time.

Towards a Reality-Based Foreign Policy

The issue confronting Canada's new, minority Liberal government is whether it can design a foreign policy that is less overreaching, less narcissistic, less sanctimonious, less ill-defined in its objectives. Its challenge is to develop a policy more directed to the reality of our national interests, more effective in securing our economic interests and, through increased resources, more likely to enable Canada to make a difference in the world. In other words, does the government of Paul Martin have the will and the desire to pursue a reality-based foreign policy for Canada?

The Martin government has announced yet another foreign policy review. It should have avoided that. These time-consuming exercises, at best, accomplish little or nothing; at worst, they blow stale air into old clichés and

encourage self-congratulation and self-deception about our place in the world.

When asked to define Canadian foreign policy, Lester Pearson, was reported to have replied, "Ask me at the end of the year and when I look back at what Canada has done, I'll tell you what our foreign policy is."

Our new government would be well-advised to follow Pearson's example. Whatever we do, we should not try to conceptualize or package our foreign policy in value-wrapped formulations about Canada's place in the world. New directions are increasingly self-evident because they are based on unavoidable realities. The challenge is to open our eyes to these realities, base our foreign policies unambiguously on them and get on with implementing them.

A reality-based foreign policy has a number of requirements.

The first is to recognize that transcendent U.S. power is the dominant feature of the contemporary international order. This is unlikely to change, in our lifetime, in favour of some restoration of nineteenth-century concepts of the balance-of-power. Call it a hyper-power, imperial power or colossus, the United States is the only state that articulates and acts on a global strategic vision. At least for the foreseeable future, it is the only state that has the power to do so. China and India, in the pursuit of their national interest, may at some later point in the twenty-first century come to exercise much greater power than they do today. The European Union might also come to pursue a global strategic vision, something it does not do now. It may even, in time, aspire to play the role of superpower, which will require it to make investments in its military capacity well beyond what its members have been prepared to do. But it is not a superpower today, nor does it wish to be.

These features of the contemporary international order do not require Canada to blindly align itself with the U.S. global strategic vision, whatever it may be now or in the future. Nor does it require Canada to nail its foreign policies to the U.S. mast. What it does require is a recognition that the configuration of power now and in the foreseeable future renders impractical any foreign policy devoted to creating counterweights to U.S. power.

The worst prescription for a realistic foreign policy for Canada is to seek differentiation from the U.S. for the sake of being different. For reasons of history, language, culture, geography, demography, security and shared values, Canada has a unique relationship with the U.S., which should rightly be regarded as special. Far from closeness posing a threat to our existence, it is a necessary condition for our economic well-being and our international effectiveness. Our potential for influencing the world's greatest power is our

comparative advantage in the world. It gives us credibility in other capitals. As U.S. power grows, so does Canada's opportunity (Gotlieb 2003a).

It is to Paul Martin's credit that he has established a permanent cabinet committee on Canada-U.S. relations under his personal chairmanship. This allows him and his government to assess all policy initiatives, domestic and foreign, within the context of the Canada-U.S. relationship. It speaks volumes about the significance of that relationship in realizing our policy goals.

A foreign policy based on "the paramountcy of Canada-U.S. relations" (Gotlieb 2003c) has been criticized as "a regional one, not truly internationalist in nature." Oxford-based Canadian author Jennifer Welsh, beyond making this assertion, states that advocates of this approach "conceive of the Canadian government as solely a profit maximizer [and] the Canadian public as motivated predominantly by the desire for greater prosperity" (Welsh 2004a; 2004b, 166ff.).

Whatever motivates the Canadian public (one would think "the desire for greater prosperity" would be pretty close to the top of the list), a foreign policy which places close Canada-U.S. relations at its core is certainly not a regional one. The very opposite is true.

To play a significant global role, if that is what Canadians want to do, requires the ability to influence the world's greatest power. This ought to be self-evident. This is not to say that Canada could not, if it were willing to make larger commitments of resources, carve out useful niches from time to time. But an effective internationalist foreign policy, one that would enable Canada to make a difference on the major issues of our time, be they political, economic, social or institutional, must be based on the reality that the U.S. is the indispensable power and our ability to influence it is potentially our greatest asset.

A second requirement for a realistic policy is the recognition that Canada's role as a middle power can never be regained. The reasons for this are many. For one thing, Canada hardly qualifies as a middle power because of the size of its economy — one of the world's largest. For another, the very concept of middle power, a creature of cold-war geopolitics, is passé. As well, there is no longer any balance of power in the world to tilt one way or another. At the same time, the Europeans, in the past mostly middle powers par excellence, have, through unification, lost much of their freedom of action on the international plane, while Asian powers are increasingly focused on regional security.

Beyond all these factors, there is yet another reason why the middle power concept is an inadequate basis for Canadian foreign policy. It is about process, not substance. "For Canada, middle powermanship is largely about

a way of conducting foreign policy. It doesn't tell us very much about what Canada wants to achieve through these means" (Welsh 2004a).

While in other times, Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau spoke often of Canada as a middle power, Prime Minister Paul Martin should not tether Canadian foreign policy to an obsolete concept. This geopolitical reality does not necessarily translate into a diminished role for Canada. In fact, the European experience offers Canada opportunities of a different character than in the past.

As Europe increasingly directs its energies to political union, its room to manoeuvre is limited by painstaking consensus-seeking and the pursuit of compromise. The Europeans have pooled their sovereignty, but they have not created a European strategic vision. The important fact is that in foreign policy, Canada has fewer constraints than the European powers. If it regains credibility in Washington and is willing to make the necessary resource commitments, Canada may again play a significant role in helping to find solutions to international problems.

A third requirement for a reality-based foreign policy is that Canadians liberate themselves from the belief that the UN is the sacred foundation of our foreign policy. Support for multilateralism and support for the UN are not equivalent.

Canadians have long espoused multilateralism as a principle of foreign policy. "Canadians" it has been said "are born with a multilateralist chromosome in their biological make-up" (Delvoie 2004, 204). We are, of course, right to be multilateralists, where circumstances warrant. But a practical or realistic perspective would make the choice of unilateralism, bilateralism or multilateralism a question of appropriate means to achieve particular ends. The UN is not the only begetter of multilateral action nor the only authority that can confer legitimacy on armed intervention.

We should also dispense with hypocrisy and moral superiority about our commitment to multilateralism and be honest enough to recognize that when it comes to pursuing our national interest, Canada has a long history of unilateralism. Even if we have a multilateralist chromosome, when our territory or sovereignty is at stake, there is a zest for unilateralism in our genes.

Under at least four prime ministers — St. Laurent, Pearson, Trudeau and Mulroney — Canadians have asserted unilateral claims to sovereignty or jurisdiction over vast maritime zones. Probably the largest claim to sovereignty anywhere on the globe was made by the government of Brian Mulroney when it enthusiastically drew straight baselines around the islands of the Arctic Archipelago. All these actions, including Canada's questionable legal behaviour on the high seas during the turbot war, and our renouncing

of recourse to the rule of law whenever we could be challenged, were greeted favourably by Canadian public opinion — sometimes with wild acclaim (Stairs 2003; Harris 1998). When it comes to asserting our own territorially based national interests, Canadian unilateralism has been consistent, aggressive and the dominant strategy for over half a century. It cannot properly be seen as consisting of sporadic and minor deviations from the true path of multilateralism.⁸

Canadians, of course, have always accepted the obvious proposition that international problems require international cooperation for their solution. We have never questioned that multilateralism is at the heart of economic and social cooperation and that international security requires solutions beyond the capacity of individual states to achieve.

Unfortunately, the commitment to multilateralism has tended to blind Canadians to the fact that the UN Charter is a flawed document. It is in relation to the UN's highest mission, maintaining international security, that these flaws are of critical relevance. Although Canadian leaders and diplomats will not recognize it, the Charter, in some ways, is as obsolete a document as the Covenant of the League of Nations, on which it was based.

This is because the Charter speaks to an earlier time, when state sovereignty was the supreme value and human rights were barely recognized as the concern of the international community. Postulated on the Westphalian concept of international order, the Charter protects the sovereignty of states, not the rights of individuals. Human rights do receive specific attention in that document, but principally as an exhortation to promote and encourage them. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and seven subsequent human rights conventions were major accomplishments, but they, of course, cannot modify the Charter's enforcement provisions.

Borrowing from the League, the Charter, in Article 2(7) explicitly exempts from the UN's jurisdiction "matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." If the UN authorizes a humanitarian intervention in a civil war to protect human rights, and there is no finding of threat to the peace, its behaviour is illegal. There must be a determination that there is a "threat to" or "breach of the peace" and the intervention must be in order to "maintain or restore international peace and security" (UN 1945, article 39).

The obstacles to such findings are hardly surprising in an organization in which dictatorships and totalitarian regimes participate on an equal footing with democracies. At least half of the membership has consisted of non-

⁸ The opinion that unilateralism is outside the mainstream of Canada's foreign policy is expressed by Hector Mackenzie (2002).

democracies at various times, thus making nonsense of the notion that the UN General Assembly is truly representative of world public opinion.

Yet the myth that the UN represents the disenfranchised of the world is so strong that the greatest champion of Canada's visionary human-security agenda, Lloyd Axworthy, argued strenuously that the "Responsibility to Protect" (ICSS 2001) the victims of the world should be the domain not of the Security Council but of the General Assembly⁹ — which, of course, includes among its some 190 members, the very dictatorships that are perpetrators of violence against their citizens (Gotlieb 2003d).

To conduct its supreme function under Chapter VII to enforce the peace, the Charter created a two-tier structure divorced from the military and economic realities of the present world. It gave veto powers to two of the five permanent members, which happened to be dictatorships for most of the life of the organization. The political reality is, given the Charter's amending procedures, the veto power cannot be removed.

Drafted before the detonation of the atomic bomb, the Charter, in Article 51, prohibits states from defending themselves against aggression "unless an armed attack occurs." When combined with Article 2(4) (UN 1945), the Charter prohibits states from the unilateral use of force in all circumstances except in response to actual armed attack. Under some circumstances, the Charter could thus provide a legal recipe for national suicide. In proclaiming a right to take forceful preventative action, the U.S. National Security strategy of 2002 (U.S. 2003) preserved common sense from the Pharisees who would give a literal interpretation to the UN Charter, even to the extent of denying to states the historic right of self-preservation.

The Charter is obsolete also in that its obligations apply only to state-actors. The sources of threat to international security today are far more complex than in past history. Terrorist networks cannot long be separated from weapons of mass destruction — with consequences almost too terrible to contemplate. Civil wars, disintegrating states and outlaw groups that flourish within them create a world far different from that foreseen in the UN Charter. Blanket prescriptions on the use of force that do not take into account the threats from non-state sectors make no sense in the contemporary world.

Yet so deeply has the UN Charter impressed itself on Canadian consciousness that when the UN is criticized, the response that is usually elicited

⁹ The commission was established by the "Human Security Network", a group of some dozen states sponsored in 1998 by Canada and Norway to promote the human security agenda.

is that the problem is "the members' failure to live up to the Charter, not the Charter itself" (Malone and Von Einseidel 2004, 364, 372).

Canadians must free themselves from this widespread manner of thinking if they are to be able to shape the response of states to the challenges of the contemporary world.

Canada and like-minded states must search out new forms of multilateral cooperation. The only alternative to unilateralism is intelligent and creative multilateralism. This will often mean coalitions of the willing, whether or not Canada wishes to join them. While there may be opportunities to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter, and every effort should be made to do so, failure to obtain UN agreement on enforcement action cannot be regarded as de-legitimizing the use of force under other auspices.

The proposal of Prime Minister Martin for the Group of Twenty to work on "important issues of global concern" (Martin 2004a), although not without problems, is creative in showing a willingness to break out of the UN framework.¹⁰ His recent statement to the UN General Assembly that "it is always preferable to have multilateral authority for intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state," seemed, at least, to leave open what might be the best grouping or forum to take the necessary humanitarian action (Martin 2004b). Canada, with its talented human resources and diplomatic experience, is well-positioned to explore new ways for selected members of the international community to cooperate in addressing the issues of our time.

As a fourth prerequisite for a reality-based foreign policy, we must also abandon our fixation with international rule-making. Canada is no more qualified to be a leader in rule-making than most other members of the UN. Some may think that, as a "moral superpower" with a value-laden foreign policy, we have a special calling to be a "norm entrepreneur," but this would be a vainglorious enterprise. Canada's reputation in the world as a constructive peacemaker has never been based on a passion for legalism and adjudication. Other than with regard to international trade, we have avoided the rule of law whenever we believed it could damage our national interests.

Nor should the makers of our foreign policy forget that the bloodiest century in our history was accompanied by the creation of more rules than in all previous centuries combined.

10 In the Speech from the Throne, October 5, 2004 (Martin 2004c), the issues of terrorism, reform of international institutions and the public health system were identified as potential topics for the Group of Twenty.

Canadians who argue that the way to affect U.S. behaviour is through trying to constrain Washington with new rules of law are romantics, not realists. There is, of course, continued room for treaty-making in many key areas of international conduct. But history shows that to be effective as law, treaties must command a consensus of the states whose conduct is to be affected. Currently, the Mines Ban Treaty, the centrepiece of Lloyd Axworthy's human security agenda, has not been ratified by many of the world's principal military powers, including the United States, Russia, China and India (Arms Control Association 2004).

Still, Canada's new government seems to be making international law and rule-making a central theme of its approach to international peace and security. Once again we seem to be trying to make ourselves feel good by taking the high road to a better world. Our new prime minister has stated that what Canada seeks is the "evolution of international law and practice, so that multilateral action may be taken in situations of extreme humanitarian emergency." He envisages the Security Council establishing thresholds that would define the circumstances that would allow for intervention (Martin 2004b).

But the idea that agreement could be reached in advance on specific norms that would distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate intervention is romantic in the extreme. The experience of intervention in the contemporary world — whether in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Zaire, or Rwanda — indicates that it is unrealistic to believe that states with the military power to intervene would ever agree on abstract authorizing principles in advance of doing so. But what is not romantic is that the people of Darfur are slaughtered while we seek UN consensus on the rules of intervention.

Utopianism, millenarianism and visionary crusades should have no place in Canadian foreign policy. This is a fifth requirement for a reality-based foreign policy. The extreme emphasis placed by our leaders in recent years on Canada's role as advocate for a world of human security is a recipe for our continued marginalization. If human security throughout the world is the aim of Canada's soft-power, then Canadians assuredly need to recognize that all the hard power in the world could not achieve it.

This does not, in any sense, mean that Canada should abandon concern for values. Canadian foreign policy should always reflect Canadian values, as was recognized in *Federalism and International Relations*, the seminal report of the Trudeau government in 1968 (Martin Sr. 1968). Humanitarian concerns are bound to preoccupy Canadians and shape our behaviour on the international plane.

But to acknowledge that our foreign policy must reflect Canadian values is not at all to say that the aim of Canadian foreign policy is to spread Canadian values (Stairs 2003).

Canadian political leaders are rightly responding to Canadian values when they accept humanitarianism as a basic component of foreign policy. But to effectively protect human rights, in concert with like-minded states, our strategies must be based on two fundamental realities: Little can be achieved unless the U.S. is willing to be a leading player, and the UN, because of its flaws, cannot, in many situations, be the instrument of protection. In advocating, once again, "the responsibility to protect", and going down the idealistic route of defining the rules of a new Copernican era where all human security is guaranteed, we risk ignoring the central reality of where power resides in the contemporary world. So far as the capacity to protect is concerned, the UN is not an alternative to the United States. Without U.S. support in most situations, the UN cannot act.

A sixth requirement for a realistic foreign policy is the willingness to commit significant resources to achieving Canada's goals. Canada's international aspirations will ring hollow and will be divorced from reality unless Canadians are willing to accord a significantly higher financial priority to the achievement of our foreign policy goals. As an astute foreign affairs practitioner has pointed out, "no amount of creativity, soft-power or sanctimony can substitute for the demonstration of conviction through resource allocation, both in terms of seeing to the requirements of those on the front lines and in regard to support of various policy adventures (Copeland 2001, note 57, 167)."

The large number of failed and failing states in the world requires those who wish to intervene to protect the victims of famine, disease, civil disorder and human rights violations to scale their ambitions to their capacity to act. Canada's international aspirations, as well as its self-interest, call for us to commit the financial resources that allow us to play a useful role in these diversified and proliferating situations. As a substantial contributor to the hard resources necessary for keeping the peace, holding states together and relieving pain and suffering, Canada's voice will have far greater resonance than as an advocate of "norm creation." We may even regain some of the influence that we wielded in earlier times.

The requirement to commit financial resources to achieve credibility in our foreign policy is not limited to our multilateral activities. Even when Canada acts unilaterally in the name of the national interest or security, the commitment to the necessary resource allocations has been absent. Some of our claims to Arctic channels remain contested (Krauss 2004, 3), but Canada

lacks the capacity to monitor them to detect the presence of foreign submarines. The Mulroney government proposed and then abandoned, some 17 years ago, a program for 10 nuclear-powered submarines to back up our claims. They remain vulnerable.

The most important requirement is the recognition that our destiny as a sovereign nation is inescapably tied to our geography. We cannot sustain relations with our colossal neighbour by being the eternal supplicant. Nor can we retain our self-respect or sustain relations by pretending that we can recruit friendly American constituencies to our side to defend us against powerful U.S. interests and lobbies. In the area of lobbying, U.S. domestic interests can trump a foreign power any day of the week.

We must try to build, as the Europeans have done, on a larger sense of community, a North American community that substitutes enforceable rights and obligations for political arbitrariness and the muscle of special interests. The reward of success in such an endeavour is the securing of our political sovereignty; the price of failure is continuing dependency and a diminishing sense of national self-confidence.

The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA were major achievements based on the North American reality, but did not go far enough in protecting our economic interest — an interest cogently summarized by the fact that bilateral trade now accounts for as much as three-quarters of our annual income.

There is no example anywhere of a major industrialized nation's resting so much of its commerce on so slender an international legal foundation. We should regard our current arrangements as a stage on the way to deeper and wider integration.

Nor can Canadians hide from the reality that U.S. security concerns dominate all other dimensions of Canada's national interest. The pronouncement of the chairmen of Congress's September 11 Commission should be engraved in the minds of all Canadians: "Every expert with whom we spoke told us an attack of greater magnitude is now possible and even probable" (New York Times 2004). The spectre of enormous disruptions of our trade and mobility casts a shadow over the welfare of all Canadians.

We cannot respond to these challenges with more Third-Option type pieties, or more Team Canada junkets. Nor can we stand still in our relationship with the United States.

Key areas of our trade were not included in our free trade agreements: Procedures for objective bilateral dispute settlement remain primitive; the flow of goods is riddled with protectionist harassment through antidumping and countervail actions; border obstacles to the movement of goods, services

and people have increased significantly since the attacks of September 11, 2001; rules of origin interrupt the flow of commerce, and concerns about security threats deepen the divide of the 49th parallel. The Ontario Chamber of Commerce has estimated the province's annual costs of border obstacles to be at least \$8 billion (Sorenson 2004).

To believe such issues can be addressed by lobbying or intermittent, patchwork arrangements is unrealistic in the extreme. The national interest requires a grand strategy, aimed at creation of a more comprehensive structure, a community of law, under which the free flow of goods and services and people can be guaranteed (Gotlieb 2003d). Whether in the form of a common market, a customs union, a community of laws inspired by the European model, or some unique hybrid, such an agreement would entail the reduction and eventual abolition of all trade-remedy actions between our two countries, and their replacement, as in Europe, with a common competition policy (Hart 2004, pp. 28–30).

A reality-based foreign policy for Canada must recognize that, in negotiating with the U.S., its security concerns are paramount. Greater economic integration should be accompanied by a common security perimeter surrounding the two countries to ensure the security of the continent and freedom of movement within. Without such a bold and innovative approach it is doubtful we will be able to achieve our trade objectives. Similarly, if Canada declines to participate in U.S. missile defense, we will be signalling to the Americans that we are not serious about the defense of the continent. The implications for our long-term economic interests are inescapable.

Would Congress be likely to agree to such a far-reaching and comprehensive accord? If Canada has the vision, and provided security is a component, there is, in time, some prospect for success. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was a Canadian initiative, yet it was the most comprehensive bilateral economic agreement ever entered into by the U.S. It abridged U.S. sovereignty in areas where this was said to be impossible, and Congress passed it. Paradoxically it may be easier to achieve a grand agreement with the U.S. than a modest one. The greater the number of interests in play, the less fatal can be the opposition of single or narrow interests.

Such an accord, which in time might include Mexico, could reduce the risk of economic fall-out from actions Canada may wish to take in the international sphere that run counter to U.S. policies. By following the path of insulating economic rights from political interference, the formation of a Canada-U.S. community of law might reinforce our sovereignty rather than diminish it.

The spectre of negative economic fallout can never be removed from the concerns of smaller countries in dealing with great powers. What does the

protection of the steel industry have to do with missile testing? In theory, they have no relation, of course. But, in the politics of the real world of Washington, the possibility of such connections can never be ignored. In entering into an overarching legal agreement to secure rights, Canada would follow in the footsteps of almost all advanced industrialized countries.

A Return to Functionalism

Finally, then, we should recognize functionalism as a realistic underlying principle of our foreign policy. A reality-based approach could take us back to the time of Mackenzie King and the Second World War, when the basis of Canadian foreign policy was functionalism. In using that word, our diplomats meant that Canadians should look at the specific issues and get involved in situations where we had the specific interests, skills and resources that would allow us to make an effective contribution.

A return to functionalism would lack glamour, but it would be a good recipe for Canada in the world of today and tomorrow. In enhancing our economic and security relationship with the United States through strengthening its legal foundation, in regaining our potential for influencing the world's foremost power, in pursuing a more creative approach to multilateralism, in rebuilding the physical and human resources enabling us to increase our contributions to troubled societies and regional conflicts, Canada would be adopting a functional foreign policy.

We could go even further. By avoiding visionary pronouncements about our foreign policy and ceasing to moralize and talk about our superior values, we could finally bring to an end our long spasms of bipolar behaviour, promote our national interest and gain both self-esteem and the respect of nations. We would, at last, have a reality-based foreign policy.

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